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Abstract
We present an example of symmetric ergodic N´players differential games, played in
memory strategies on the position of the players, for which the limit set, as N Ñ `8, of
Nash equilibrium payoffs is large, although the game has a single mean field game equilibrium.
This example is in sharp contrast with a result by Lacker [23] for finite horizon problems.
Introduction
In this note we want to underline the role of information in mean field games. For this we
study the limit of Nash equilibrium payoffs in ergodic N´player stochastic differential games
as the number N of players tends to infinity. Since the pioneering works by Lasry and Lions
[24] (see also [20]) differential games with many agents have attracted a lot of attention under
the terminology of mean field games. We also refer the reader to the monographs [3, 10]. Mean
field games are nonatomic dynamic games, in which the agents interact through the population
density.
Here we investigate in what extend the mean field game problem is the limit of the N´person
differential games. This question is surprisingly difficult in general and is not completely un-
derstood so far in full generality. When, in the N´player game, players play in open-loop (i.e.,
observe only their own position but not the position of the other players), the mean field limit
is a mean field game. The first result in that direction goes back to [24] in the ergodic setting
(see also [1, 17] for statements in the same direction); extensions to the non Markovian setting
can be found in Fischer [18] while Lacker gave a complete characterization of the limit [22] (see
also [25] for an exit time problem). Note that these (often technically difficult) results are not
entirely surprising since, in the N-player game as well as in the mean field game, the players do
not observe the position of the other players: therefore there is no real change of nature between
the N´player problem and the mean field game.
We are interested here in the N´player games in which players observe each other, the
so-called closed-loop regime. In this setting, the mean field limit is much less understood and
one possesses only partial results. In general, one formalizes the closed-loop Nash equilibria in
the N´person game by a PDE (the Nash system) which describes the fact that players react in
function of the current position of all the other players. The first convergence result in this setting
[6] states that, in the finite horizon problem and under a suitable monotonicity assumption, the
solution of the Nash system converges to a MFG equilibrium. The convergence relies on the
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construction of a solution to the so-called master equation, a partial differential equation stated
in the space of probability measures. The result was later applied and extended to different
frameworks, with similar—or closely related—techniques of proof in [2, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14].
Recently Lacker [23] introduced completely different arguments to handle the problem. He
proved the convergence of the closed-loop Nash equilibria to “extended” MFG equilibria. Even
more surprisingly, his result extends to generalized Markov strategies, where players can remem-
ber the past positions of the other players (memory strategies). The key remark is that, for a
large number of players and “in average”, the fact that a single player deviates does not change
too much the (time dependent) distribution of the players. Note that [23] holds in a set-up in
which the noise of each player is non degenerate.
It is important to point out that the result of [23] cannot be extended to strategies in which
players observe the controls of the other players. Indeed, the so-called Folk Theorem [4, 21]
states that players can detect and “punish” a player who deviates and therefore, even when the
number of players is large, the behavior of a single player completely changes the outcome of the
game. A way to understand [23] is that, because of the (nondegenerate) noise, the observation
of a player’s position does not give information on the fact that this player has deviated or not.
The aim of the present paper is to address a similar question for (a particular class of) ergodic
differential games. Let us first recall that, in the open-loop regime, limits of Nash equilibria in the
N´player game are MFG equilibria [1, 17, 24]. On the other hand, in the closed loop Markovian
regime, the convergence problem is surprisingly open up to now, although the existence of a
solution to the ergodic master equation is known [8]: Indeed in this ergodic set-up, the use of
the solution to the master equation is not obvious and the technique of proof of [6] does not
seem to apply. Here we concentrate on the limit of equilibria in N´player differential games
with generalized Markov strategies. While, for the finite horizon problems, these Nash equilibria
always converge to MFG equilibria [23], we show that this is no longer the case in the ergodic
regime.
This means that, when the horizon becomes infinite, players can learn from the other players
even if they observe their positions only. Our convergence result is reminiscent of the Folk
Theorem of [4], but in a framework of an ergodic cost and in which players observe only the
positions of the other players.
In order to explain more precisely our result, let us describe the framework in which we work.
We consider N´player differential games played in strategies depending on the past positions of
all the players (See Subsection 1.2 below). Player i (where i P t1, . . . , Nu) minimizes an ergodic
and symmetric cost of the form
lim sup
TÑ`8
1
T
E
„ˆ T
0
pLpαit,Xitq ` F pmN,iXt qqdt

where, for any j P t1, . . . , Nu, Xj is the position of player j at time t, αj is the control of player
j, X “ pX1, . . . ,XN q,
m
N,i
Xt
:“ 1
N ´ 1
ÿ
j‰i
δ
X
j
t
is the empirical measure of all players but player i and the dynamic of Xj is just
dX
j
t “ αjtdt` dBjt ,
where the Bj are independent d´dimensional Brownian motion. Moreover, F : PpTdq Ñ R is
a sufficiently smooth map (where PpTdq is the set of Borel probability measures on Td). Note
that we work here with periodic data (and thus in the d´dimensional torus Td).
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In this setting the mean field game payoff is unique and given by eMFG :“ ´λ0 ` F pµ0q,
where µ0 is the unique invariant measure solution to the equation
´1
2
∆µ0 ´ divpµ0HppDu0pxq, xqq “ 0
and the pair pu0, λ0q is the unique solution to the ergodic Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
´1
2
∆u0 `HpDu0, xq “ λ0 in Td
where
Hpp, xq “ sup
aPRd
´a ¨ p´ Lpa, xq
(see [8]).
On the other hand, the “social cost” (i.e., the smallest cost a global planner can achieve, see [9])
is given by
emin :“ inf
µ,α
ˆ
Td
Lpαpxq, xqµpdxq ` F pµq,
where the infimum is taken over all pair pµ, αq where µ is the invariant measure on Td associated
with the distributed control α : Td Ñ Rd, i.e., satisfying the equation
´1
2
∆µ` divpµαq “ 0 in Rd.
Our result states that, for any
e P remin,´λ0 `maxF q, (0.1)
there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium payoff peN , . . . , eN q in the N´player game such that
eN converges to e. Unless F is constant, the interval in (0.1) has a non empty interior:
emin ă eMFG ď ´λ0 `maxF
(see [9]). So the limit of the N´player game contains many more Nash equilibrium payoffs than
the MFG one, including the social cost.
Let us underline again that our result says nothing on the convergence, as N Ñ `8, of the
solution pvN,iq of the N´player Nash system
´1
2
Nÿ
j“1
∆xjv
N,ipxq `HpDxivN,ipxq, xiq `
ÿ
j‰i
Dxjv
N,ipxq ¨HppDxjvN,jpxq, xjq “ F pmN,ix q ` λN,i
for i “ 1, . . . , N and x “ px1, . . . , xN q P pTdqN . This convergence is, so far, an open problem.
The paper is organized as follows: in the first section, we state our assumptions and intro-
duce the main definitions (Nash equilibria in generalized Markov strategies, mean field game
equilibria, social cost). The second section is dedicated to the statement and the proof of the
existence of several mean field limits.
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1 Notation, assumption and basic definitions
1.1 Notation and assumptions
Our game takes place in Rd. However our data are Zd´periodic in space, which means that we
mostly work in the d´dimensional torus Td “ Rd{Zd and we denote by π : Rd Ñ Td the natural
projection. Given a Borel probability measure m on Rd, we often project it into the set PpTdq
of Borel probability measures on Td by considering π7m defined by
ˆ
Td
fpxqπ7mpdxq :“
ˆ
Rd
fpπpxqqmpdxq @f P C0pTdq.
Our problem involves the following data: The Lagrangian L : RdˆTd Ñ R satisfies, for some
constant C0 ą 0:
L “ Lpα, xq is of class C2, with C´1
0
Id ď D2α,αLpα, xq ď C0Id. (1.2)
It will often be convenient to extend L to Rd ˆ Rd by setting Lpα, xq “ Lpα, πpxqq. The map
F : PpTdq Ñ R satisfies
F is of class C1 with y Ñ δF
δm
pm, yq bounded in C2pTdq uniformly in m. (1.3)
Let us recall that for F to be of class C1 means that there exists a continuous map δF
δm
:
PpTdq ˆ Td Ñ R such that
F pm1q ´ F pmq “
ˆ
1
0
ˆ
Td
δF
δm
pp1 ´ sqm` sm1, yqpm1 ´mqpdyqds @m,m1 P PpTdq.
In particular, F is continuous in m. It will be convenient to assume that
F is not constant on PpTdq. (1.4)
Throughout the paper and for any N P N, the initial condition px1
0
, . . . , xN
0
q P pTdqN is fixed
(and actually irrelevant).
1.2 Nash equilibria in generalized Markov strategies
In the N´player game, players play nonanticipative strategies on the trajectory of the other play-
ers: namely, a strategy of player i P t1, . . . , Nu is a bounded map αi : R`ˆpC0pR`,RdqqN Ñ Rd
which is Borel measurable and such that, for any pxjqj“1,...,N and pyjqj“1,...,N in pC0pR`,RdqqN
which coincide on r0, ts, we have
αippxjqj“1,...,N qs “ αippyjqj“1,...,N qs a.e. on r0, ts.
These strategies are called “generalized Markov strategies”. We denote by A the set of generalized
Markov strategies for a player (note that it does not depend on i since all the players are
symmetric).
For given pα1, . . . , αN q P AN and an initial condition x0 “ px10, . . . xN0 q P pRdqN , let us consider
the SDE "
dXis “ αipX1¨ , . . . ,XN¨ qds` dBis, s ě 0, i P t1, . . . , Nu,
Xi0 “ xi0 i P t1, . . . , Nu.
(1.5)
Using Girsanov’s theorem, we can find a filtered probability space pΩ,F ,F “ pFtqtě0,Pq and,
on this space, a couple of processes pXt, Btqtě0 with values in RdˆN ˆ RdˆN , such that X “
4
pX1, . . . ,XN q is adapted to F, B is a F-Brownian motion and equation (1.5) is satisfied for all i.
Moreover the couple pX, Bq is unique in law. In what follows, as in Lacker [23], we keep in mind
that for each N -uple of strategies, the process X is defined on a different probability space, but,
for the comfort of the reader, we don’t mention this dependence in the notations.
In this game, we assume that the payoff of players takes the form of an ergodic cost of mean field
type. Given a family of strategies α “ pα1, . . . , αN q P AN , the cost J i of player i P t1, . . . , Nu is
J ipαq “ lim sup
TÑ`8
1
T
E
„ˆ T
0
pLpαit,Xitq ` F pπ7mN,iXt qqdt

where X “ pX1, . . . ,XN q is the solution to (1.5), mN,i
Xt
is the empirical measure of all players
but player i:
m
N,i
Xt
:“ 1
N ´ 1
ÿ
j‰i
δ
X
j
t
. (1.6)
In this setting, the definition of a symmetric Nash equilibrium payoff is the following:
Definition 1.1. Fix a symmetric initial position x0 “ px0, . . . x0q P pRdqN . We say that e P R
is a symmetric Nash equilibrium payoff (in generalized Markov strategies) if, for any ε ą 0, there
exists α¯1 P A a strategy for player 1, which is symmetric with respect to the other players:
α¯1px1, x2, . . . , xN q “ α¯1px1, xσp2q, . . . , xσpNqq @x1, . . . , xN P C0pR`,Rdq,
for any permutation σ on t2, . . . , Nu and such that, if we define the strategy of player i by
α¯ipx1, . . . , xN q :“ α¯1pxi, x2, . . . , xi´1, x1, xi`1, . . . , xN q,
then α¯ :“ pα¯1, . . . , α¯N q is an ε´Nash equilibrium with payoff close to e: for any i P t1, . . . , Nu,
J ipα¯q ď J ipαi, pα¯jqj‰iq ` ε @αi P A
and ˇˇ
J ipα¯q ´ eˇˇ ď ε.
1.3 The ergodic MFG equilibrium
As the number N of players tends to infinity, one often expects that the limit of an N´player dif-
ferential game becomes a mean field game. As our game is of ergodic type, the MFG equilibrium
takes the form of the following ergodic MFG, in which the unknown are pλ, u, µq:$’’’’’’&
’’’’’’%
´1
2
∆u`HpDu, xq “ F pµq ` λ in Td,
´1
2
∆µ´ divpµHppDu, xqq “ 0 in Td,
µ ě 0,
ˆ
Td
µ “ 1.
(1.7)
It turns out that, for our problem, the unique MFG equilibrium has a very simple structure:
Proposition 1.2. The unique MFG equilibrium is given by pλ0 ´ F pµ0q, u0, µ0q where pλ0, u0q
solve the ergodic problem
´1
2
∆u0 `HpDu0, xq “ λ0 in Td
(u0 is unique up to constants) and µ0 is the unique probability measure such that
´1
2
∆µ0 ´ divpµ0HppDu0, xqq “ 0 in Td.
5
In this case, the payoff of the MFG equilibrium is given by
eMFG :“ ´λ0 ` F pµ0q.
Proof. The proof is immediate, since, pλ, u, µq :“ pλ0 ´ F pµ0q, u0, µ0q satisfies the MFG system
(1.7) and the solution of this system is unique because F , being independent of x, satisfies the
standard Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition (see [24]).
Let us recall for later use that the measure ν0 :“ pId,´HppDu0qq7µ0 minimizes the energy
´ λ0 “
ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqν0pda, dxq “ inf
ν
ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqνpda, dxq (1.8)
where the infimum in the last term is computed among all the Borel probability measures on
R
d ˆ Td which are closed (see [19]):
ˆ
RdˆTd
pa ¨Dφ` 1
2
∆φqνpda, dxq “ 0 @φ P C8pTdq. (1.9)
1.4 The social cost
A last notion of interest in our problem is the social cost, or the cost for a global planner. It
takes the form
emin :“ inf
pm,αq
ˆ
Rd
Lpαpxq, xqmpdxq ` F pmq, (1.10)
where the infimum is computed among the pairs pm,αq, where m P PpTdq and α P L2mpTd,Rdq
satisfy the constraint
´ 1
2
∆m` divpmαq “ 0 in Td. (1.11)
We will often use the fact that, if pm,αq is as above, then the measure ν :“ pId, αq7m satisfies
(1.9) and therefore ˆ
Td
Lpαpxq, xqmpdxq ě ´λ0.
It is known (see [19]) that, under our continuity and growth assumption on L and F in (1.2)
and (1.3), the problem has at least one solution pm˜, α˜q and that, under the differentiability
assumption (1.3) on F , there exists u˜ : Td Ñ R of class C2 such that the pair pu˜, m˜q satisfies the
(new) MFG system $&
%
´1
2
∆u˜`HpDu˜, xq “ δF
δm
pm˜, xq in Td
´1
2
∆m˜´ divpm˜HppDu˜, xqq “ 0 in Td
with α˜pxq “ ´HppDu˜pxq, xq. In view of the regularity of u˜, m˜ is at least of class C2 and is
positive.
In a previous paper [9] (in a more general set-up than here, for time dependent MFGs), we
have proved that there is no equality between the MFG and the social cost, unless F is constant:
More precisely, if F satisfies (1.4), then
emin ă eMFG ď emax :“ ´λ0 ` max
mPPpTdq
F pmq. (1.12)
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2 The convergence result
We explain here that, for our problem, one cannot expect the convergence of all the Nash
equilibria in generalized Markov strategies to the MFG equilibrium:
2.1 The main theorem
Theorem 2.1. Under the assumptions (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) on L and F , and for any
e P remin, emaxq,
there exists a sequence of symmetric Nash equilibrium payoffs peN q in the N´player game such
that
lim
NÑ`8
eN “ e. (2.13)
Let us recall that emin, defined by (1.10), corresponds to the “social cost”, while emax, intro-
duced in (1.12), is not smaller than the cost associated with the mean field game. In view of
(1.12), Theorem 2.1 implies that the limit of symmetric Nash equilibria in generalized Markov
strategies is not necessarily an MFG equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast with the finite horizon
problem studied by Lacker in [23].
The construction of the symmetric Nash equilibrium payoffs eN is based on the “Folk The-
orem” in differential games: see [4]. In general, the Folk Theorem is related to the observation
of the control of the players. Surprisingly here, only the observation of the position of the other
players is necessary: this is specific to the ergodic cost (and of the particular structure of our
game).
2.2 Proof of the main theorem
As F and L are bounded below, we can assume without loss of generality that
L ě 0, F ě 0. (2.14)
The first step consists in showing that the cost e can be achieved by a suitable stationary
solution pmˆ, αˆq:
Lemma 2.2. There exists pmˆ, αˆq, of class C1, with mˆ a probability measure on Td with a positive
density, satisfying (1.11) and such that
e “ min
α
ˆ
Td
Lpαpxq, xqmˆpxqdx` F pmˆq “
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpxqdx` F pmˆq, (2.15)
where the infimum is taken over the vector fields α P L2mˆpTd,Rdq such that pmˆ, αq satisfies (1.11).
In addition, there exists a sequence pmn, αnq, of class C1, with mn a probability measure on
T
d with a positive density, satisfying (1.11) and such that
lim
n
F pmnq “ maxF, min
α
ˆ
Td
Lpαpxq, xqmnpxqdx “
ˆ
Td
Lpαnpxq, xqmnpxqdx.
Proof. In a first step, we show that there exists pmˆ1, αˆ1q of class C1, with mˆ1 a probability measure
on Td with a positive density, satisfying (1.11) and such that
e ă min
α
ˆ
Td
Lpαpxq, xqmˆpxqdx` F pmˆ1q “
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆ1pxq, xqmˆ1pxqdx` F pmˆ1q, (2.16)
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where the infimum is taken over the vector fields α P L2mˆ1pTd,Rdq such that ´∆mˆ1`divpmˆ1αq “ 0
in Td. For proving this, we now build the sequence pmn, αnq, where, for each n, pmn, αnq is a
minimum of the problem:
inf
!
n´1
ˆ
Td
Lpαpxq, xqmpxqdx ´ F pmq, where m P PpTdq, α P L2mpTd,Rdq,
´∆m` divpmαq “ 0 in Td
)
.
Let us recall that such a minimum exists (see Subsection 1.4). In addition, there exists un such
that pun,mnq solves the MFG system$&
%
´1
2
∆un `HpDun, xq “ ´n δF
δm
pmn, xq,
´1
2
∆mn ´ divpmnHppDun, xqq “ 0,
with αn “ ´HppDun, xq. In particular, pmn, αnq is of class C1 and mn has a positive density.
Next we claim that
lim
n
F pmnq “ maxF.
Indeed, we can find another sequence pµkq of smooth and positive probability densities on Td
such that pF pµkqq converges to maxF . Let us set βk :“ Dplogpµkqq. Then pµk, βkq satisfies the
constraint (1.11) and therefore, for any k and by the optimality of pmn, αnq,
maxF ě lim sup
n
F pmnq ě lim inf
n
F pmnq ě lim inf
n
´
´n´1
ˆ
Td
Lpαnpxq, xqmnpxqdx` F pmnq
¯
ě lim inf
n
´
´n´1
ˆ
Td
Lpβkpxq, xqµkpxqdx` F pµkq
¯
“ F pµkq.
Letting k Ñ `8 proves that pF pmnqq converges to maxF . Then, recalling the characterization
of λ0 in (1.8), we have
e ă ´λ0 `maxF ď lim inf
n
ˆ
Td
Lpαnpxq, xqmnpxqdx` F pmnq.
So, for n large enough, we have
e ă
ˆ
Td
Lpαnpxq, xqmnpxqdx` F pmnq.
Setting pmˆ1, αˆ1q :“ pmn, αnq for such a large n proves the first step. We also set for later use
uˆ1 :“ un and recall that αn “ ´HppDuˆ1, xq.
We now build the pair pmˆ, αˆq required in the lemma. For λ P r0, 1s, let mλ be the unique
invariant measure associated with the vector field αλpxq :“ ´HppDφλpxq, xq, where φλ :“ p1 ´
λqu˜ ` λuˆ1. Note that mλ is unique, of class C1 and has a positive density since αλ is of class
C1. Moreover, λ Ñ mλ is continuous in C1 by the same argument. Next we note that αλ is a
minimum of the problem:
inf
"ˆ
Td
Lpαpxq, xqmλpdxq, where α P L2mλpTd,Rdq, ´∆mλ ` divpmλαq “ 0 in Td
*
.
Indeed it is well-known that a vector field α is a minimum of this problem if and only if there
exists φ P H1pTdq such that α “ ´HppDφ, xq and the pair pmλ,´HppDφ, xqq satisfies (1.11):
this is indeed the case for αλ by construction.
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As the map λ Ñ ´
Td
Lpαλ, xqmλ ` F pmλq is continuous and as it is equal to emin (which
is not larger than e) for λ “ 0 and—by (2.16)—is not smaller than e for λ “ 1, we can find
λ P r0, 1s such that e “ ´
Td
Lpαλ, xqmλ ` F pmλq. We set pmˆ, αˆq :“ pmλ, αλq from now on and
pmˆ, αˆq satisfies the required conditions.
A second lemma shows that αˆ remains ǫ-optimal in (2.15), after a sufficiently small pertur-
bation of mˆ.
Lemma 2.3. For any ε ą 0 there exists δ ą 0 (depending on ε), such that, for any closed Borel
probability measure σ on Rd ˆ Td with second marginal µ and with d1pµ, mˆq ď δ, one has
ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqσpda, dxq ě
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpdxq ´ ε.
Proof. By the definition of pmˆ, αˆq, αˆ minimizes the quantity
ˆ
Td
Lpx, αpxqqmˆpxq,
where the infimum is taken over the maps α P L2mˆpTdq such that
´∆mˆ` divpmˆαq “ 0.
Let us now argue by contradiction and assume that there exists a sequence pσnq of closed mea-
sures, with second marginal mn converging to mˆ and with
ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqσnpda, dxq ă
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpdxq ´ ε. (2.17)
In view of the coercivity of L with respect to the first variable, the sequence σn is tight and
there exists a subsequence (still labelled in the same way) which converges to some measure σ
on Rd ˆ Td. Note that σ is closed (as the limit of the pσnq which are closed) and its second
marginal is mˆ. Let us disintegrate σ with respect to mˆ: σ “ σxpdαqmˆpdxq and let us set
α˜pxq :“ ´
Td
ασxpdαq. Then pmˆ, α˜q satisfies (1.11) since the measure σ is closed. In addition, by
convexity of L with respect to the first variable and (2.17),
ˆ
Td
Lpα˜pxq, xqmˆpdxq ď
ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqσxpdaqmˆpdxq ď lim sup
n
ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqσnpda, dxq
ď
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqµˆpdxq ´ ε,
which contradicts the optimality of αˆ.
We now build the Nash equilibrium payoff and the corresponding strategies. Let pmˆ, αˆq and
pmn, αnq be as in Lemma 2.2. Let us set
eN :“
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpdxq `
ˆ
pTdqN´1
F pmN,1x qmˆpdx2q . . . mˆpdxN q.
(Recall that the empirical measure mN,1x is defined by (1.6)). By the Glivenko-Cantelli law of
large numbers and (2.15),
peN q converges to e. (2.18)
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As e ă ´λ0 ` maxF and by definition of pmn, αnq, we can choose n large enough (and fixed
from now on) such that, for any N large enough (given again by the Glivenko-Cantelli law of
large numbers),
eN ď ´λ0 `
ˆ
pTdqN´1
F pmN,1x qmnpdx2q . . . mnpdxN q. (2.19)
Our aim is to prove that, under the above conditions, eN is a Nash equilibrium payoff of
the N´player game played in generalized Markov strategies. For this, we fix ε ą 0. Given
T, δ ą 0 to be chosen below depending on ε, we define the strategies βN,T,δ,i as follows: Given
pX1, . . . ,XN q P pC0pR`,RdqqN , we define
θpX1, . . . ,XN q “ inf
#
t ě T, sup
jPt1,...,Nu
d1pπ7
ˆ
1
t
ˆ t
0
δ
X
j
s
ds
˙
, mˆq ě δ
+
(with the usual convention θpX1, . . . ,XN q “ `8 if the right-hand side is empty). Then we set
βN,T,δ,ipX1, . . . ,XN qt “
"
αˆpXitq if t ď θpX1, . . . ,XN q
αnpXitq otherwise.
We are going to show that, if T is large enough and δ is small enough (depending on ε), then
pβN,T,δ,iq is an ε´Nash equilibrium with payoff given by eN .
Lemma 2.4. The payoff of the strategies pβN,T,δ,iq is almost eN :
|J ippβN,T,δ,jqq ´ eN | ď ε @i P t1, . . . , Nu. (2.20)
Proof. Let pXitq and pXˆitq be respectively the solutions to the systems
dXit “ βN,T,δ,ipX¨qtdt` dBit , Xi0 “ xi0, i “ 1, . . . , N (2.21)
and
dXˆit “ αˆpXˆitqdt` dBit , Xi0 “ xi0, i “ 1, . . . , N, (2.22)
We can find a filtered probability space endowed with an RNˆd-valued Brownian motion on
which, for all i, both (2.21) and (2.22) admit strong solutions Xi and Xˆi. In particular, setting
θ “ θpX1, . . . ,XN q, they satisfy Xis “ Xˆis for all s ě 0 and i, a.s. on the event ts ď θu.
Define the random time
τ “ sup
#
t ą 0, sup
i“1,...,N
d1pπ7
ˆ
1
t
ˆ t
0
δ
Xˆis
ds
˙
, mˆq ě δ
+
,
with supH “ 0. Since, by the ergodic Theorem, for P´a.e. ω P Ω,
lim
tÑ`8
π7
ˆ
1
t
ˆ t
0
δ
Xˆispωq
ds
˙
“ mˆ in PpTdq, (2.23)
the time τ is finite a.s. . It follows that
P
«
inf
#
t ě T, sup
jPt1,...,Nu
d1pπ7
ˆ
1
t
ˆ t
0
δ
Xˆ
j
s
ds
˙
, mˆq ě δ
+
ă `8
ff
“ P rτ ě T s Ñ 0 as T Ñ `8.
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So, given a fixed K ą 0 to be chosen below, we can choose T large enough, depending on N , δ,
ε and K, such that
P rθ ă `8s ď K´1ε.
Recalling (2.14), we have
J ippβN,T,δ,jqq ď lim sup
tÑ`8
1
t
E
„
1θ“8
ˆ t
0
LpαˆpXˆisq, Xˆisq ` F pπ7mN,iXˆs q ds

` lim sup
tÑ`8
1
t
E
„
1θă8
ˆ t
0
LpβN,T,δ,ipX¨qs,Xisq ` F pπ7mN,iXs q ds

ď lim sup
tÑ`8
1
t
E
„ˆ t
0
LpαˆpXˆisq, Xˆisq ` F pπ7mN,iXˆs q ds

` CPrθ ă `8s,
where C “ maxxPTd |Lpαˆpxq, xq| ` |Lpαnpxq, xq| ` }F }8. By (2.23), we have
lim
tÑ`8
1
t
ˆ t
0
LpαˆpXˆisq, Xˆisq ` F pπ7mN,iXˆs q ds
“
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpxqdx`
ˆ
pTdqN´1
F pmN,ix qΠj‰imˆpxjqdxj “ eN .
So
J ippβN,T,δ,jqq ď eN ` CPrθ ă `8s ď eN ` CK´1ε ď eN ` ε,
if we choose K “ C. One can show in a similar way that J ippβN,T,δ,jqq ě eN ´ 2ε, which proves
that (2.20) holds.
Next we estimate the cost of player 1 (to fix the ideas) if she deviates and plays some strategy
β instead of βN,T,δ,1.
Lemma 2.5. Let β be a generalized Markov strategy for player 1. Then
J1pβ, pβN,T,δ,jqj‰1q ě eN ´ ε.
Proof. Let pXjq be the solution of the system
dX
j
t “ βN,T,δ,ipXtqdt` dBjt , Xj0 “ xj0 if j ě 2,
dX1t “ βpXtqdt` dB1t , X10 “ x10. (2.24)
We set θ :“ θpXq where X “ pX1, . . . ,XN q and chose again a probability space on which
X1, . . . ,XN and Xˆ1, . . . , XˆN are strong solutions of (2.24) and (2.22) respectively, and therefore
X
j
s^θ “ Xˆjs^θ a.s., for all s ě 0 and j ě 2. So
J1pβ, pβN,T,δ,jqj‰1q “ lim sup
tÑ`8
E
”
1θ“`8
1
t
ˆ t
0
LpβpX¨q,X1s q ` F pπ7mN,1Xˆs q ds
` 1θă8 1
t
ˆ t
0
LpβpX¨qs,X1s q ` F pπ7mN,1Xs q ds
ı
. (2.25)
We evaluate successively all the terms in the right-hand side. For the first term, we claim that,
a.s. in tθ “ `8u and for t large enough, we have
1
t
ˆ t
0
LpβpX¨q,X1s q ` F pπ7mN,1Xˆs q ds ě e
N ´ ε. (2.26)
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For the second term, we are going to prove that a.s. in tθ ă `8u and for t large enough, we
have
1
t
ˆ t
0
LpβpX¨qs,X1s qds ě ´λ0 ´ ε{2 (2.27)
and
1
t
ˆ t
t^θ
F pπ7mN,i
Xs
q ds ě
ˆ
pTdqN´1
F pmN,1x qmnpdx2q . . . mnpdxN q ´ ε{2. (2.28)
Proof of (2.26). By Lemma 2.3, we can choose δ ą 0 small enough (depending on ε but not
on T ) such that, for any closed Borel probability measure σ on Rd ˆ Td with second marginal µ
such that d1pµ, mˆq ď δ, we haveˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqσpda, dxq ě
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpdxq ´ ε{3. (2.29)
Let us recall that σ being closed means that σ satisfies (1.9).
We claim that, a.s. on the event tθ “ `8u and for any t large enough, we have
1
t
ˆ t
0
LpβpX¨q,X1s qds ě
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpdxq ´ 2ε{3. (2.30)
To prove this, we fix pφkq an enumerable and dense family of C2pTdq. Let Ω0 be the set of
ω P tθ “ `8u such that, for any k P N,
lim
tÑ`8
1
t
ˆ t
0
DφkpX1s q ¨ dB1s “ 0. (2.31)
By Doob’s inequality, Ω0 has a full probability in tθ “ `8u. Let us now argue by contradiction
and assume that, for some ω P Ω0, there exists a sequence tn Ñ `8 such that
1
tn
ˆ tn
0
LpβpX¨pωqq,X1s pωqqds ă
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpdxq ´ 2ε{3. (2.32)
Let σn “ σnpωq be the Borel probability measure defined on Rd ˆ Td by
ˆ
RdˆTd
φpa, xqσnpda, dxq “ 1
tn
ˆ tn
0
φpβpX¨pωqq,X1s pωqqds, @φ P C0b pRd ˆ Tdq.
Let us denote by µn the second marginal of σn. Then, by the definition of θ and as θ “ `8, we
have d1pµn, µˆq ď δ as soon as tn ě T . Note that, by coercivity of L and (2.32), the sequence
σn is tight. Hence there exists a Borel probability measure σ on R
d ˆ Td and a subsequence,
denoted in the same way, such σn converges to σ. Let µ be the second marginal of σ. Then
d1pµ, mˆq ď δ. Let us check that σ is closed. Indeed, we have, for any k P N,
ˆ
RdˆTd
p∆φkpxq ` a ¨Dφkpxqqσnpda, dxq “ 1
tn
ˆ tn
0
p∆φkpX1s q ` βpX¨q ¨DφkpX1s qqds
“ 1
tn
”
φkpX1tnq ´ φkpx10q ´
?
2
ˆ tn
0
DφkpX1s qq ¨ dB1s
ı
which tends to 0 a.s. as nÑ `8 thanks to (2.31). So, for any k P N,
ˆ
RdˆTd
p∆φkpxq ` a ¨Dφkpxqqσpda, dx, ωq “ 0.
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By the density of the (φk), this proves that the measure σ is closed. Letting nÑ `8 in (2.32),
we also have, by our convexity assumption on L in (1.2),
ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqσpda, dxq ď
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqmˆpdxq ´ 2ε{3.
(See, e.g., Corollary 3.2.3. in [16]). This contradicts (2.29). So, for any ω P Ω0 and for t large
enough, (2.30) holds.
As the measure on pTdqN´1 defined by
pπ, . . . , πq7
ˆ
1
t
ˆ t
0
δpXˆ2s ,...,XˆNs q
ds
˙
converges a.s. to the unique invariant measure on pTdqN´1 associated with the drift px2, . . . , xN q Ñ
pαˆpx2q, . . . , αˆpxN qq, which is µˆpdx2q b ¨ ¨ ¨ b µˆpdxN q, we have, a.s. and for t large enough,
1
t
ˆ t^θ
0
LpβpX¨q,X1s q ` F pπ7mN,1Xˆs q ds
ě
ˆ
Td
Lpαˆpxq, xqµˆpdxq `
ˆ
pTdqN´1
F pmN,1x qµˆpdx2q . . . µˆpdxN q ´ ε “ eN ´ ε.
This is (2.26).
Proof of (2.27). We now turn to the estimate of the term tθ ă `8u in the right-hand side
of (2.25) and first show that (2.27) holds. For this, we argue as for the proof of (2.30). We fix
pφkq an enumerable and dense family of C2pTdq. Let Ω0 be the set of ω P tθ ă `8u such that,
for any k P N, (2.31) holds. We argue by contradiction, assuming that there exists ω P Ω0 and
tn Ñ `8 such that
1
tn
ˆ tn
0
LpβpX¨qs,X1s qds ă ´λ0 ´ ε{2. (2.33)
Exactly as above, let us define the measure σn “ σnpωq as the Borel probability measure on
R
d ˆ Td such that
ˆ
RdˆTd
φpa, xqσnpda, dxq “ 1
tn
ˆ tn
0
φpβpX¨q,X1s qds, @φ P C0b pRd ˆ Tdq.
By the coercivity of L and assumption (2.33), the sequence σn is tight and we can find σ and a
subsequence, denoted in the same way, such σn converges to σ. We can check as above that σ
is closed. Letting n Ñ `8 in (2.33), we also have, by convexity of L with respect to the first
variable, ˆ
RdˆTd
Lpa, xqσpda, dxq ď ´λ0 ´ ε{2.
This contradicts the characterization of λ0 in (1.8) and (2.27) holds in Ω0.
Proof of (2.28). Next we note that, on tθ ă `8u, we have, for j ‰ i,
dXjs “ αnpXjs qds ` dBjs , for s ě θ.
So, the measure on pTdqN´1 defined by
pπ, . . . , πq7
ˆ
1
t
ˆ t
0
δpX2s ,...,XNs qds
˙
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converges a.s. to the unique invariant measure associated with the drift
px2, . . . , xN q Ñ pαnpx2q, . . . , αnpxN qq,
which is mnpdx2q b ¨ ¨ ¨ bmnpdxN q. So, for t large enough, (2.28) holds.
Conclusion. We now collect our estimates to evaluate the RHS of (2.25). As all the terms
in the RHS of (2.25) are bounded below, we have, by Fatou and by (2.26), (2.27) and (2.28),
J1pβ, pβN,T,δ,jqj‰1q ě
´
eN ´ ε
¯
P rθ “ `8s
`
´
´λ0 `
ˆ
pTdqN´1
F pmN,1x qmnpdx2q . . . mnpdxN q ´ ε
¯
P rθ ă `8s .
By (2.19), this proves that J1pβ, pβN,T,δ,jqj‰1q ě eN ´ ε.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. In view of Lemma 2.4 and Lemma 2.5, the strategies pβN,T,δ,jq satisfy the
conditions in Definition 1.1 with symmetric payoff peN , ¨ ¨ ¨ , eN q. As, by (2.18), eN converges to
e, this proves the theorem.
References
[1] Arapostathis, A., Biswas, A., & Carroll, J. (2017). On solutions of mean field games
with ergodic cost. Journal de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées, 107(2), 205-251.
[2] Bayraktar, E., & Cohen, A. (2018). Analysis of a finite state many player game using
its master equation. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 56(5), 3538-3568.
[3] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and P. Yam, Mean field games and mean field type
control theory, vol. 101, Springer, 2013.
[4] Buckdahn, R., Cardaliaguet, P., and Rainer, C. (2004). Nash equilibrium payoffs for
nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. SIAM journal on control and optimization,
43(2), 624-642.
[5] Cardaliaguet, P. (2010). Notes on mean field games. Technical report.
[6] Cardaliaguet P., Delarue F., Lasry J.-M., Lions P.-L. The master equation and
the convergence problem in mean field games. To appear in Annals of
Mathematics Studies.
[7] Cardaliaguet, P. (2017). The convergence problem in mean field games with a local
coupling. Applied Mathematics & Optimization, 76(1), 177-215.
[8] Cardaliaguet, P., & Porretta, A. (2017). Long time behavior of the master equa-
tion in mean-field game theory. To appear in Analysis and PDEs. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1709.04215.
[9] Cardaliaguet, P., Rainer, C. (2018). On the (in) efficiency of MFG equilibria. To
appear in Sicon. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.06637.
14
[10] Carmona, R., Delarue, F. (2018). Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games
with Applications I-II. Springer Nature.
[11] Cecchin, A., & Pelino, G. (2018). Convergence, fluctuations and large deviations
for finite state mean field games via the master equation. To appear in Stochastic
Processes and their Applications.
[12] Cecchin, A., Dai Pra, P., Fischer, M., & Pelino, G. (2018). On the convergence
problem in Mean Field Games: a two state model without uniqueness. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.05492.
[13] Delarue, F., Lacker, D., & Ramanan, K. (2018). From the master equation to mean
field game limit theory: A central limit theorem. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.08542.
[14] Delarue, F., Lacker, D., & Ramanan, K. (2018). From the master equation to
mean field game limit theory: Large deviations and concentration of measure. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1804.08550.
[15] Delarue, F., & Tchuendom, R. F. (2018). Selection of equilibria in a linear quadratic
mean-field game. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.09137.
[16] Fathi A. (2008) Weak kam theorem in lagrangian dynamics. Preliminary
version number 10, by CUP.
[17] Feleqi, E. (2013). The derivation of ergodic mean field game equations for several
populations of players. Dynamic Games and Applications, 3(4), 523-536.
[18] Fischer, M. (2017). On the connection between symmetric n-player games and mean
field games. The Annals of Applied Probability, 27(2), 757-810.
[19] Gomes, D. A., & Valdinoci, E. (2011). Duality Theory, Representation Formulas
and Uniqueness Results for Viscosity Solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations. In
Dynamics, Games and Science II (pp. 361-386). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
[20] Huang, M., Malhamé, R. P., & Caines, P. E. (2006). Large population stochastic
dynamic games: closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equiv-
alence principle. Communications in Information & Systems, 6(3), 221-252.
[21] Kononenko, A. F. (1976). On equilibrium positional strategies in nonantagonistic
differential games. In Doklady Akademii Nauk (Vol. 231, No. 2, pp. 285-288). Russian
Academy of Sciences.
[22] Lacker, D. (2016). A general characterization of the mean field limit for stochastic
differential games. Probability Theory and Related Fields, 165(3-4), 581-648.
[23] Lacker, D. (2018). On the convergence of closed-loop Nash equilibria to the mean
field game limit. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.02745.
[24] J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions, Mean field games, Japanese Journal of Mathematics, 2
(2007), pp. 229–260.
[25] Nutz, M. (2018). A mean field game of optimal stopping. SIAM Journal on Control
and Optimization, 56(2), 1206-1221.
15
